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Does students' hand tremble after marking three consecutive identical answers in a multiple 
choice test? We design an experiment to study if the likelihood to change incorrectly to a 
different answer than the last one depends on the number of identical previous answers. We 
do not find a clear treatment effect, but observe that indeed the likelihood to change to an 
incorrect answer increases in the number of identical previous answers given by the 
student, even after controlling for how prepared (s)he was overall and how certain (s)he was 
that the answer to a given multiple choice question is correct. We claim that this behavior 
possibly is a reasonable reaction to previous exam experience. 
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Összefoglaló 
 
Megremeg a diákok keze, miután három ugyanolyan választ adtak feleletválasztós tesztben? 
Egy kísérletet végzünk, amelyben megvizsgáljuk, hogy miként függ a korábbi azonos 
válaszok számától annak valószínűsége, hogy egy diák helytelenül a következő kérdésre más 
választ ad. Nem találunk világos kezelési hatást, de az látható, hogy a helytelen válaszra való 
áttérés valószínűsége nő a korábbi azonos válaszok számában, még akkor is, ha figyelembe 
vesszük a diákok felkészültségét és azt, hogy mennyire voltak biztosak a válasz 
helyességében. Úgy gondoljuk, hogy ezen döntéshozatal ésszerű reakciónak tekinthető a 
korábbi vizsgatapasztalatok fényében. 
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Abstract
Does studentshand tremble after marking three consecutive identical
answers in a multiple choice test? We design an experiment to study if
the likelihood to change incorrectly to a di¤erent answer than the last
one depends on the number of identical previous answers. We do not
nd a clear treatment e¤ect, but observe that indeed the likelihood to
change to an incorrect answer increases in the number of identical previous
answers given by the student, even after controlling for how prepared
(s)he was overall and how certain (s)he was that the answer to a given
multiple choice question is correct. We claim that this behavior possibly
is a reasonable reaction to previous exam experience.
Keywords : belief, experiment, gamblers fallacy, multiple choice
JEL Classication : C93; D03; D84
1 Introduction
Beliefs play an important role in economic theory. Standard models assume
that peoples view on the distribution of the states of the world is correct on av-
erage. However, there is a growing body of evidence that documents deviations
from correct beliefs and shows the ways beliefs may be systematically inaccurate
(see DellaVigna, 2009 for a review). A deviation from standard belief forma-
tion is often based on the inadequate weighting of recent available information.
Concretely, consider the case when people are making the same kind of choice
repeatedly. When observing a sequence of the same outcome they may have
one of the three following belief: (1) that the streak is irrelevant, (2) that the
streak will continue, or (3) that the streak will stop (Burns and Corpus, 2004).
An example of the belief that a streak should continue is the hot hand fallacy
(Gilovich et al., 1985), whereas the gamblers fallacy (see for instance Ayton
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under the project
ECO 2011-25349 and from the Hungarian Scientic Research Fund (OTKA) under the project
PD 105934 are kindly acknowledged. Eötvös Loránd University - Department of Economics;
Research fellow in the Momentum(LD-004/2010) Game Theory Research Group Institute of
Economics Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences;
and A¢ liate Fellow at CERGE-EI, Prague. Email: kiss.hubert.janos@krtk.mta.hu.
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and Fischer, 2004) is an illustration of the tendency to believe that a streak of
events is likely to end.
This paper studies if students when taking a multiple choice test make some
inference about the right answer based on the previous pattern of answers given.
We are interested also in whether the conclusions that they draw (if it is the
case) are incorrect or not. That is, after marking three consecutive Bs do
students believe that the next answer is less likely to be another B? And if
it is the case, are they wrong? To test if such a phenomenon at rst glance
similar to the gamblers fallacy may be at play during exams we carried out
a eld experiment. In several exams of the same academic subject we divided
students in two groups randomly and they received the same test (25 multiple
choice questions in the same order and 5 short essay questions) with only one
di¤erence. In the control group the right answers varied often between questions,
while in the treatment group answers were arranged in a way that sequences
of identical answers were frequent. We controlled also for how certain students
were in their answers in an incentivized way and also for how prepared the
students were through the essay questions. The results show that there is no
clear treatment e¤ect, but the longer the sequence of identical previous answers,
the more probable is that a student incorrectly marks a di¤erent answer. While
this behavior is reminiscent of the gamblers fallacy, we argue that it is more
likely that studentsdecision is driven by their previous experience. Multiple
choice tests generally exhibit an alternating pattern of correct answers and when
uncertain about the right answer students tend to mark answers so that this
varying pattern is reproduced.
2 Experimental Design and Conjectures
2.1 Design
There were 5 sessions, corresponding to the exam dates in May and June, 2012.
In total 153 students (105 women) participated in the experiment.1 Subjects
were undergraduate students enrolled in the International Studies Program of
the Faculty of Social Sciences on the Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest, Hun-
gary). Students could freely choose when to take the exam on International
Economics. There was one exam each week during the exam period. The ques-
tions varied from exam to exam, though there were questions which appeared
in several exams.
Each session had two treatments. In both treatments, the students had to
answer 25 multiple choice questions and 5 short essay questions. Multiple choice
questions were valued 2 points if the answer was correct and zero otherwise.
There was no point deduction for incorrect answers. In each essay question
students received 10 points for the right explanation and less if important details
1126 students took the exam once. Those who failed or wanted to improve their mark
could take the exam again. There were 25 students who took the exam twice and 2 students
did it three times.
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were left out.
Questions in both treatments were the same and in the same order, there
was only one di¤erence. In treatment 0 (our control), the right answers varied
frequently, there were 23 alternations between answers. In treatment 1 (where
the possible answers were the same as in treatment 0), there were a lot less
alternations (only 9), streaks of the same answer were abundant. These were
the pattern of answers in the treatments:
Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Tr 0 B A D A D B C D A B D D B A D C A B C D B A C D B
Tr 1 A B B B D D D D A A A C C C C D A B B B B A D D D
Figure 1. The pattern of correct answers in the two treatments
From session to session we changed the pattern of answers slightly by re-
naming the answers: for instance, the A answers in session 1 became B answers
in session 2. In this way the structure of the answers and the number of alter-
nations remained the same across all sessions.
When the students arrived, they could freely choose a seat. Before starting
the exam we rearranged a bit the seating so that students be equally seated, with
su¢ cient space between them in order to minimize the possibility of copying. At
the beginning of the exam we explained loudly in front of the students the rules
of the exam. Once the exam started talking was forbidden and we suspended
those students who were caught either talking, copying from other or using illicit
materials (it was a closed book exam). We monitored intensely throughout the
exam to minimize cheating. Exam sheets were handed out in a way that students
next to each other received di¤erent versions (treatment 0 and treatment 1).
Note that there is a potential confounding if we do not control for how
certain students were about their answers. Imagine that a student after two
B answers changes to C, B still being the right answer. Without knowing how
certain (s)he was we may classify it as a change to an incorrect answer due
to the students trembling hand. However, if the certainty point reveals that
(s)he really thought that C was the right answer, then we can exclude this
case as a manifestation of the trembling-hand hypothesis. Thus, we told the
students when explaining the rules of the exam that they could earn 3 extra
points if they assessed correctly their performance. To do so they were asked to
rate after each multiple choice question how certain they were if their answer
was correct. These certainty points ranged from 1 to 5, 5 (1) meaning that
somebody was totally (un)certain about the correct answer. In the instructions
(for details see the Appendix) we specied that if the number of right answers
divided by 5 is within a certain range (0:25) of the mean of the certainty points,
then the students self-assessment was considered accurate and (s)he received 3
extra points. For instance, a student that had 20 correct answers received the
extra points, if the average of her certainty points lied between 3.75 and 4.25.2
2Unfortunately, this is not a perfect control since it has an inherent upward bias in the case
of the most uncertain answers. When a student is totally uncertain about the right answer,
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These potential extra points served to incentivize subjects to think hard over
the certainty points. Regarding the certainty points, we emphasized two issues
at the beginning of the exam. First, we stressed that lling in the certainty
points is not compulsory. Second, we assured students that certainty points
are used for research purposes (we did not specify the nature of the research)
and do not inuence grades negatively. More precisely, we made clear that if
somebody is guessing (which can be revealed through low certainty points) but
happens to give the right answers, (s)he will get the corresponding points and
grade, no points are deducted for guessing. Note that there was no value of
strategic signaling by giving high certainty points to suggest that somebody is
sure in the answers and knows the material well. High certainty points did not
a¤ect the grade per se, only if they corresponded with the actual points earned.
2.2 Conjectures
Our rst conjecture posits the expected existence of a treatment e¤ect. If stu-
dents tremble when observing streaks of previous answers, then they are more
likely to score less in treatment 1.
Conjecture 1 All else being equal, on average students in treatment 1 score
less points in the multiple choice questions than students in treatment 0.
The second conjecture is about the likelihood of changing incorrectly the
answer from one question to another. Hence, we focus on those cases in which
this change is not justied, that is a student marks a di¤erent answer than the
previous one even though the right answer is the same. We conjecture that the
more identical previous answers marked by the student, the more likely is that
such an incorrect change occurs.3
Conjecture 2 All else being equal, the probability of an incorrect change in
answers is increasing in the number of identical previous answers.
We remark that there are many studies about behavior when taking a mul-
tiple choice test. These analyze various topics like guessing (e.g. Burgos, 2004;
Espinosa and Gardeazabal, 2010) or gender di¤erences in multiple choice test
(for instance, Siegfried, 1979; Ballard and Johnson, 2005; Marín and Rosa-
García, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, no study focuses on the topic that
we are investigating.
then we would like her/him to give 1 certainty point, but by pure guessing the student has
25% chance of hitting the right answer, so s(he) may nd optimal to give a higher point. In
spite of this imperfection we hope to have captured at least partially how sure students were
in their answers.
3Note that what matters is the number of identical previous answers that the student
thought right and marked on the answer sheet, and not the ones that are actually right.
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3 Results
First, we present some descriptive statistics about the points received in the
exam. Since in session 2 and 5 just a small number of students (17 and 9)
took part we executed detailed analysis on the rest of the sessions. However,
we considered the observations obtained in these sessions in the overall analysis
Table 1 shows the mean points achieved in multiple choice test, the average of
certainty points and the average of essay points according to treatments.
Treatment 0 Treatment 1 Treatment 0 Treatment 1 Treatment 0 Treatment 1
Date 1 35.5 (30) 32.64 (28) 3.81 (30) 3.78 (28) 25.67 (30) 27.68 (28)
Date 3 34.42 (19) 34 (20) 3.94 (16) 3.98 (13) 34.42 (19) 33.45 (20)
Date 4 34.67 (24) 33.94 (35) 3.97 (23) 3.99 (27) 33.54 (24) 28 (35)
Overall 34.66 (86) 33.83 (96) 3.86 (79) 3.92 (81) 29.73 (86) 29.67 (96)
Points in multiple choice
test
Average of certainty
points
Average of essay points
Number of observations in brackets. The number of observations for the certainty points may be
lower since not all students filled in the certainty points.
Table 1. Multiple choice test, certainty and essay points
.
Using both Wilcoxon ranksum test and t-test w end that there is no signif-
icant di¤erence in certainty and essay points, except for the essay points at date
4. There in treatment 0 the essay points were signicantly higher than in treat-
ment 1 at 10 % signicance level. The number of observations indicates that not
each student lled in the certainty points as it was not compulsory. Those who
lled in the certainty points achieved better results in multiple choice test (34.59
vs. 31.55) and the di¤erence is signicant at 5% signicance level according to
the one-sided t-test (H1: points of those who lled in > points of those who
did not), though the Wilcoxon ranksum test fails to reject the hypothesis that
points in both groups were the same. Henceforth, we restrict our attention to
those who marked how certain they were regarding their multiple choices.
Since di¤erences are generally not signicant regarding the certainty and the
essay points, so di¤erences in the multiple choice test are unlikely to be driven
by di¤erences in the student pool that was assigned to the treatments. Although
multiple choice test points are higher in treatment 0 in all cases, t-tests and the
non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test fail to reject the null hypothesis that
points in treatment 0 and 1 are the same, both for multiple choice test and
certainty points. The only exception is the multiple choice test point at date 1
for which the one-sided t-test (H1: points in treatment 0 > points in treatment
1) reveals signicant di¤erence at 10 % signicance level. These tests suggest
that the treatment did not produce a signicant e¤ect.
To test the rst conjecture we run an OLS regression where the dependent
variable is how many points a student scored in the multiple choice test. The
independent variables include: i) a treatment dummy (0 for normal test and
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1 for the treated test); ii) certainty (the average of the certainty points which
reects how sure students were about the correct answers; it ranges from 1 to
5); iii) essay (the points obtained for the essay questions as a proxy for how well
prepared were the students for the exam; it ranges from 0 to 50); iv) female (1
for women and 0 for men) and v) assessment (a dummy that is 1 if the average
of certainty points was within a predetermined interval relative to the average of
the points scored in the multiple choice test, reecting how well students assess
their own performance).
We run the above regression for each date with a su¢ cient number of stu-
dents (date 1, 3 and 4) and for the pooled data. For the last case we include
date dummies (for each exam date, and date 1 being the baseline) and standard
error is clustered on the individual level. The results are as follows:
date 1 date 3 date 4 overall
treatment -3.03**
(1.18)
-0.20
(2.19)
2.13
(1.51)
-0.77
(0.79)
certainty 3.54***
(1.27)
2.53
(2.00)
4.18***
(1.48)
4.12***
(1.21)
essay 0.22***
(0.06)
0.19
(0.14)
0.30***
(0.07)
0.23***
(0.06)
female -0.55
(1.23)
-3.81
(2.60)
-0.02
(1.54)
-0.64
(0.88)
assessment 3.83***
(1.28)
5.32*
(2.64)
4.95***
(1.62)
4.74***
(0.77)
constant 15.20***
(4.52)
19.32**
(7.44)
6.4 (5.4) 11.57***
(3.91)
N 58 29 50 160
Prob>F 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.6 0.43 0.6 0.52
Dependent variable: Points in multiple choice test
*/**/*** denote 10%/5%/1% significance level. Standard
erros in brackets.
Table 2. OLS regression results
Treatment has a signicant e¤ect at date 1. Points obtained in the multiple
choice test are 3 points lower in the treated group even if we control for the
other variables. However, at the other dates and when looking at the overall data
treatment has no signicant e¤ect. This result suggests that the treatment e¤ect
is not pervasive as already foreshadowed by the tests. Even if we manipulate
extensively the alternation rates across treatments, it does not cause a signicant
di¤erence in the achieved multiple choice test points.
It is worth noting that, all other things held constant, certainty has almost
in each case a highly signicant positive e¤ect, indicating that students who are
more certain about the correct answers achieve more points. We nd also that
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students who are able to evaluate their performance well generally achieve 4-5
points more than those who do not. Unsurprisingly, students who are better
prepared (hence have higher essay points) also score more points in multiple
choice test. We do not report in the last column of the table the date e¤ect
since date dummies are not signicant.4
The second conjecture suggests that the likelihood of incorrect decisions
is increasing in the number of identical answers. To test this conjecture, we
examine the determinants of the likelihood of incorrect changes. We run a
probit regression in which the dependent variable IC is a dummy with value 1
if there was an incorrect change. The variable assessment, essay and female are
dened as before. The variable same equals the number of identical answers
given by the student (not the actually right answers) for the preceding multiple
choice questions. Certainty_q is the certainty point assigned to a given question
(and not the average of the certainty points!). We also include date dummies
for each exam day, the rst exam day being the baseline. We cluster standard
errors on individual level.
Since in treatment 0 the alternation rate is very high, so there incorrect
changes are very rare by construction. Therefore, we limit ourselves to the data
coming from treatment 1. Table 3 shows the marginal e¤ects after our probit
regression which are evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables.
Table 3. Marginal e¤ects of the probit regression
The probit analysis supports Conjecture 2. The number of identical previ-
ous answers (the length of the streak before the examined question) represented
by the variable same has a signicant positive e¤ect in all but one session and
when considering the pooled data the e¤ect is signicant at 1 % signicance
4 If we do not restrict our attention to those who lled in the certainty points, but consider
the whole sample, then still there is a treatment e¤ect at date 1 but not at the other date and
when considering the pooled data. Essay is highly signicant at all dates and also when taking
all observations together. When looking at the pooled data, the date dummy is signicant
only at date 3, indicating that at that exam students scored less points in the multiple choice
test relative to date 1.
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level. If the streak before a given question contains one more identical answer
it increases the probability of incorrect change by 2-4%, all else being the same.
The certainty point of the question has a signicant negative e¤ect on the prob-
ability of possible changes. One point increase in the certainty point decreases
the probability of incorrect change by 4-5 %, ceteris paribus. The essay points
as a proxy of how prepared the student was show a signicant e¤ect in all but
one case: ten additional points achieved by the student decrease the probability
of incorrect change by 1-2 %, all else held constant. Assessment has a negative
e¤ect and is signicant overall, suggesting that students who evaluate better
their performance commit less incorrect changes. The variable female is highly
signicant in one session, but overall its e¤ect does not seem to be important.
From the last column we omitted the date dummies since they are not signicant
except the dummy for date 4 (at 10 % signicance level).
4 Discussion
Although we do not nd a clear treatment e¤ect, it seems that there are forces
at work that make that students tend to mark a di¤erent answer after a se-
quence of identical answers. Most notably, the more identical previous answers,
the more probable that a student commits an incorrect change. Can we ra-
tionalize this nding? In the case of the gamblers fallacy the underlying data
generating process is entirely random, subsequent events are independent. In
our case, the professor generates the answer pattern, so the studentstendency
to alternate the answers when uncertain about the right answer may just ex-
press their expectations about the pattern chosen by the professor. Students
may be used to multiple choice tests in which the correct answers tended to
vary frequently. To check if this explanation has some bite we gathered mul-
tiple choice tests from our colleagues to see if answers are serially correlated
or not. Having checked 20 exams from last years we found that indeed the
pattern of right answers is highly variable. We measured the serial correlation
as 1 minus the number of alternations between correct answers divided by the
number of possible alternations.5 This measure varies between 5 and 29 % (20
% on average) in the case of the tests we examined, while in our treatment 1
it is 62.5 %. Hence, possibly students that are unsure about the right answer
use their experience with multiple choice tests as a guide and mark a di¤erent
answer when observing a streak of previous identical answers. Without knowing
anything about the pattern-setting behavior of the professor this strategy seems
reasonable. Therefore, possibly there is no fallacy, but a potential reaction to
previous experience.
5For example if there were 22 multiple choice questions in an exam with 17 alternations
between answers (the correct answers were similar to the previous ones 4 times), it yields the
value 1- 17
21
, that is 19 percent.
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6 Appendix
International Economics 2. - Group A
Date: 29/06/2012.
You have 90 minutes to complete the exam.
The exam has two parts. Part one consists of a multiple choice test with 25
questions. There is only one right answer to each question. The correct answer
9
scores 2 points, incorrect or unanswered questions yield zero point. Mark the
answers with an X in the table below. You are not allowed to change your
answer in the table, corrected answers give zero point! When evaluating the
exam I only consider the answers marked in the table. In part two of the exam
you nd ve essay questions, each worth 10 points.
Grades are determined as follows:
0-49 points fail
50-59 points pass
60-69 points satisfactory
70-79 points good
80-100 points outstanding
In the last row of the table you may mark on a scale of 1 to 5 how sure you
are about the answer given (1: totally unsure, ..., 5: totally sure) This last row
does not a¤ect grading: if somebody is unsure about the answer, but marks the
right answer, then she / he will get the 2 points. However, if these "certainty
points" correspond to the actual points, then 3 extra points are awarded. More
precisely, if the (number of good answers/5) indicator is within 0:25 of the
average of the certainty points, then those extra points are given. For example,
if somebody obtains 20 good answers and the the average of the certainty points
is between 3.75 and 4.25, the she / he receives 3 extra points.
Filling in this last row is NOT compulsory. We would like to use these data
for research purposes.
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